Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

RandR Industrial Park, LLC, Repair Express, Inc,
and Alumatek, Inc., v. The Utah Property and
Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association :
Appellee/Cross Appellant, R&R Industrial Park,
LLC's Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert G. Gilchrist; Jeffrey D. Eisenberg; Eisenberg & Gilchrist; Attorneys for Alumatek Inc.;
Timoth Dalton Dunn; Gerry Holman; Dunn & Dunn; Attorneys for Utah Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association.
Andrew M. Morse; Richard A. Vazquez; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for R&R
Industrial Park.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, RandR Industrial Park v. The Utah Property and Casualty, No. 20070107 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/74

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
R & R INDUSTRIAL PARK, L.L.C.,
REPAIR EXPRESS, INC., and
ALUMATEK, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
Appellees/Cross Appellants,

APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANT, R&R
INDUSTRIAL PARK, L.L.C.'s
REPLY BRIEF

vs.

THE UTAH PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,

Appeal Case No. 20070107-CA

Defendant,
Appellant/Cross Appellee
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Oral Argument Requested

ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
JEFFREY D. EISENBERG
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST
Parkside Office Tower
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Alumatek, Inc.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JAN - 2 2008

TIMOTHY DALTON DUNN
GRACE ACOSTA
GERRY HOLMAN
DUNN & DUNN, PC
505 East 200 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Utah Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association

ANDREW M.MORSE
RICHARD A. VAZQUEZ
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
R & R Industrial Park T. T r

1ABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ARGUMENT
I.

1

ONLY R & R' S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION SERVES THE
UTAH ACT'S PURPOSE OF PROTECTING INSUREDS

1

II.

THE UTAH ACT IS AMBIGUOUS

2

ill

SUBSTANTIAL CASE LAW SUPPORTS R & R'S POSITION

5

IV.

THE EXCESS POLICY ALSO PROVIDES ( AVERAGE

7

V.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT RELIEVE R & R OF THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT
R & R PROPERLY MARSHALED ALL COMPETENT EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS

9
10

Kelly Johnson's supplemental report (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross
Appellee at 19)

11

Finding that UPCIGA's expert was more credible (Reply Brief and Brief
of Cross Appellee at 19)

12

Judge Frederick's comments (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross Appellee
at 20)

12

Trial testimony of Patrick Kilbourne (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross
Appellee at 20)

13

Arguments of UPCIGA counsel, Gerry Holman (Reply Brief and Brief of
Cross Appellee at 21)

13

Third-Party Complaint of R & R and Summary Judgment Memorandum
of R & R (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross Appellee at 21)

14

VT

A.

C.

E.

F.

VII.

UNILATERALLY INVALIDATING THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF
LAW

14

CONCLUSION

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

15
3

Huggins v. Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and ABC Insurance Co., 950 So.2d 750
(La. Ct. App. 2006)

8

In re E. H., 137 P.3d 809 (Utah 2006)

10

In the Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

13

In the Matter of Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986)

14

Indiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Blickensderfer, 778 N.E.2d 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)

6

Jimenez v. O'Brien, 213 P.2d 337 (Utah 1949)

15

Quinn v. City of Kansas City, 64 F.Supp.2d 1084 (D. Kan. 1999)

15

Ryan v. Beaver County, 21 P.2d 858 (Utah 1933)

14

Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 133 P.3d 428 (Utah 2006)

3

State v. Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159 (Utah 2003)

9

Summit Water Distr. Co. v. Summit Cty., 123 P.3d437 (Utah 2005)

1

U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993)

8

United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1993)

15

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202

1, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-203

4, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-213

4
RULES

Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b)

15
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004)

11

IV

ARGUMENT

L

ONLY R & R'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION SERVES THE UTAH
ACT'S PURPOSE OF PROTECTING INSUREDS
When considering the competing statutory interpretations offered by R & R and

UPCIGA, the Court must ask which interpretation best serves the stated purpose of the
Act, which is "to protect resident policy owners and insureds under all types of direct
insurance. . .." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202. Clearly, only R & R's proposed
interpretation serves this purpose.
"It is well-settled.. . . that our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislative intent as evidenced by the statute's plain language in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve." Summit Water Distr. Co, v. Summit Cty.9 123 P.3d437,
442 (Utah 2005).
UPCIGA's proposed interpretation would offset amounts R & R received from
other insurers from UPCIGA's statutory coverage obligation to the insureds of Reliance
Insurance Company. This would place UPCIGA's own interests above the interests of
Reliance's insureds. R & R's proposed interpretation would allow the insured, CDR, the
maximum liability protection permitted under UPCIGA's $300,000 per-covered-claim
statutory obligation. This interpretation would "protect" CDR from an excess judgment
that would place its own assets at risk.
UPCIGA clamors that adoption of R & R's interpretation would "usurp the
legislative branch function" by adopting a pro-insured policy "by judicial fiat." See
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 9. Quite the contrary, R & R's

interpretation is the sole interpretation that would effect the stated purpose of the statute the protection of insureds and policyholders.
UPCIGA also claims that the Utah Act "does not state its purpose is to put the
insured in the same position it would have been had there been no insolvency." See
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 9. This merely states the
obvious. UPCIGA's statutory obligation is $300,000 per covered claim. If the Utah Act
were meant to restore insureds to their pre-insurer-insolvency status, there would be no
statutory cap on UPCIGA's obligation. Yet UPCIGA complains that even this restrictive
cap on its obligations is insufficient. It suggests the Court go even further, and adopt a
reading of the Utah Act that would render its legislative mandate to protect insureds
meaningless in most instances.
UPCIGA correctly states that this Court is not "bound by judicial interpretations of
other jurisdictions who are construing different statutes than Utah's." See Reply Brief of
Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 10. What does bind this Court is the legislative
pronouncement of the Utah Act, which expressly states that its purpose is to "protect
resident policyholders and insureds." Only by adopting R & R's proposed statutory
interpretation, and by following the analysis of cases which support that interpretation,
can the Court fulfill the mandate of the Utah legislature.
II.

THE UTAH ACT IS AMBIGUOUS
UPCIGA argues that the Utah Act is unambiguous. Curiously, UPCIGA does so

without at all addressing the standard for statutory ambiguity - it simply argues that its

preferred interpretation of the statute is supported by the statute's plain language. See
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 11.
In order to find the statute ambiguous, the Court need only find that either of
R & R's proposed interpretations of the statute is plausible. A statute is ambiguous
"when it is capable of two or more plausible meanings." Derbidge v. Mutual Protective
Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "In other words, for a proffered
alternative interpretation to [be found plausible], it must be more than a conjecture but
may be less than a certainty." Saleh v. Farmers Inc. Exch., 133 P.3d 428, 433 (Utah
2006).
R & R has advanced two plausible interpretations of the Utah Act which support
offset from the total loss, rather than UPCIGA5 s statutory obligation. UPCIGA does not
even attempt to show why either is not plausible. See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief
of Cross Appellee at 10-15. Rather, UPCIGA argues as follows:
R & R and Alumatek contend that the reference to "any amount payable" under an
insurance policy somehow changes the plain meaning of the statute to mean
UPCIGA only offsets monies received from other insurance policies against the
"total amount of loss to the insured." The problem with that interpretation is that
it requires the reader to ignore the plain language of the statute that requires "any
amount payable on the covered claim is reduced by the amount of any recovery
under the insurance policy described in Subsection 1(a)."1 A covered claim is
only a claim up to $300,000. .. . The phrase "[a]ny amount payable on a covered
claim under this part under an insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any
recovery under the insurance policy described in subsection 1(a)" has to apply to
offset UPCIGA's obligation of up to $300,000, because UPCIGA is not obligated
on any "amount payable on a covered claim" above the $300,000 statutory limit.
1

Here, UPCIGA misstates the language of the applicable section. The actual language of
the section reads: "Any amount payable on a covered claim under this part under an
insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any recovery under the insurance policy
described in Subsection (l)(a).
^

See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross Appellee at 11.
As stated in R & R's opening brief, R & R's proposed interpretations are both
plausible, and directly at odds with UPCIGA's. The Utah Act states that UPCIGA's
"obligation" on covered claims is "only that amount of each covered claim that is less
than $300,000." Yet Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-213, which describes UPCIGA's setoff
rights on covered claims, contains undefined terms that render it ambiguous:
a)
Any person who has a claim against an insurer, whether or not the
insurer is a member insurer, under any provision in an insurance policy,
other than a policy of an insolvent insurer that is also a covered claim, is
required to first exhaust that person's right under that person's policy.
(b)
Any amount payable on a covered claim under this part under an
insurance policy is reduced by the amount of any recovery under the
insurance policy described in Subsection (l)(a).
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-213.
The phrases "amount payable" and "an insurance policy" are not defined. The
phrase "[a]fry amount payable on a covered claim under this part under an insurance
policy" can therefore plausibly refer to any amount payable on a covered claim under any
insurance policy. The phrase "an insurance policy" does not limit itself to the specific
insurance policy for which UPCIGA is obligated. Under such a reading, as stated in
R & R's opening brief, would bind UPCIGA to the full $300,000 amount per claim.
Additionally, the term "claim" is also ambiguous. The term "covered claim" is
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-203:
an unpaid claim, including an unpaid claim under a personal lines policy
for unearned premiums submitted by a claimant, if:

4

(i) the claim arises out of the coverage;
(ii) the claim is within the coverage;
(iii) the claim is not in excess of the applicable limits of an
insurance policy to which this part applies;
(iv) the insurer who issued the policy becomes an insolvent
insurer; and
(v) (A) the claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the
time of the insured event; or
(B) the claim is a first-party claim for damage to property that
is permanently located in this state.
The term "claim" stands alone in the definition of "covered claim." As stated in
R & R's opening brief, if "claim" is defined as an abstract legal interest, right or remedy,
then Section 213 could be read as follows:
(b) Any amount payable on a covered claim (an abstract legal right or
remedy that validly arises under an insolvent insurer's policy) under this
part under an insurance policy, is reduced by the amount of any recovery
under the insurance policy described in Subsection 1(a)
Both of R & R's proffered interpretations are plausible and reasonable. These
interpretations are the only interpretations that will serve the Act's legislatively mandated
purpose of protecting policyholders and insureds.
III.

SUBSTANTIAL CASE LAW SUPPORTS R & R'S POSITION
UPCIGA argues that the majority of case law interpreting similar statutes may

actually support its statutory interpretation regarding offset. See Reply Brief of Appellant
and Brief of Cross Appellee at 13-14. Upon review of the cases cited by UPCIGA,
R & R acknowledges that the cases nationwide that support its interpretation may either
be in the majority, in the minority, or the cases may be equally divided. One case
undercutting UPCIGA's position that UPCIGA fails to cite is Indiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v.

c

Blickensderfer, 778 N.E.2d 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).2 In Blickensderfer, two physicians
were sued for medical malpractice and they sought defense and indemnity from the
Indiana Guaranty Association. Each doctor held a malpractice policy with $100,000 per
occurrence. The health insurers of both claimants each paid over $100,000 in medical
expenses for the injuries resulting from the malpractice. The Guaranty Association
claimed an offset under the statutory non-duplication provision. The court held that no
setoff was permitted since health insurance benefits were expressly excluded under the
Act and because allowing the setoff would yield "an absurd result:"
The Indiana legislature surely did not intend that the statute would require a
claimant to exhaust a claimant's rights under any conceivable insurance
policy for any conceivable claim that may then be pending, even if such a
claim or such a policy had nothing to do with the claim against the
insolvent insurer. Such an interpretation would indeed produce an absurd
result.
M a t 443.
In the present case, UPCIGA's proposed interpretation, too, would result in
absurdity. Though the stated purpose of the Act is to "protect insureds," UPCIGA would
have its minimal statutory obligation offset by recovery from every conceivable policy,
for any conceivable claim that may be pending, even if such a claim or such a policy had
nothing to do with the claim against the insolvent insurer. UPCIGA is correct that how
other jurisdictions construe their own Guaranty Acts "ultimately may not make a
difference because this court must construe the Utah statute." The Utah statute's stated

2

As Blickensderfer supports R & R's position on statutory interpretation, the tally of
cases cited by R & R and UPCIGA presently stands at 14 cases in favor of R & R's
position and 14 cases in favor of UPCIGA's position.
c

purpose is protecting insureds. R & R's interpretation is the only interpretation that
accomplishes that end.
IV.

THE EXCESS POLICY ALSO PROVIDES COVERAGE
UPCIGA makes no effort to address R & R's arguments regarding coverage under

Reliance's excess policy, which also triggers UPCIGA's second $300,000 obligation.
Because R & R's total damages available under the Reliance policies, including both
subrogated and unsubrogated losses, exceeded $1 million, UPCIGA's obligation to pay
an additional $300,000 is clearly triggered.
The relevant insuring language under the Reliance excess policy reads:
7.
Subject to 4., 5., or 6. above, whichever applies, EXCESS
LIABILITY COVERAGE is excess of an amount not less than the amount
shown in the Schedule of Primary Insurance for the applicable primary
insurance, except: [neither exception applies]
The amount shown in the EXCESS UMBRELLA COVERAGE
SCHEDULE OF PRIMARY INSURANCE for the applicable primary
insurance is as follows:
General Liability Insurance
Policy Number: PB 1 14079 1 Policy Period: From 1010 1/98 to:
1010 1100
General Aggregate Limit $2,000,000
(Other than Products-Completed Operations)
Products-Completed Operations $2,000,000
Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Limit $1,000,000
Per Occurrence Limit $1,000,000
Fire, Explosion or Water Damage Limit $100,000
(R. 2870)
The underlying $1,000,000 loss limit is clearly met, R & R was paid
$1,517,609.86 by CNA, its first party insurer. This amount could have been sought by

n

R & R in a subrogation lawsuit against CDR, had Reliance not become insolvent.
However, as discussed earlier, subrogated losses are not permitted recoveries under the
Act. Subrogated losses, however, are recoverable (or at least not precluded) under the
language of the Reliance excess policy.3 Had Reliance remained solvent, its exposure
would have included the $1,517,609.86 in subrogated losses suffered by R & R. Since
R & R was awarded $399,898.67 in unsubrogated losses inclusive of prejudgment
interest at the evidentiary hearing, R & R's total losses recoverable from CDR were
$1,917,508.53. UPCIGA's cited case, Huggins v. Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc. and ABC
Insurance Co., 950 So.2d 750 (La. Ct. App. 2006), is therefore inapposite. lnHuggins,
the insured expressly stipulated that her damages did not exceed one million dollars, the
limit of the underlying policy issued by Reliance. In the present case, R & R's total
damages clearly exceeded $1 million, triggering coverage under the umbrella policy.
The "purpose" of the Act is to "protect resident policy owners and insureds under
all types of direct insurance...." The Act does not differentiate between primary and
excess insurance. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-28-202 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the
definition of "covered claim" under the Act includes a claim that "is not in excess of the
applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this part applies." Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-28-203. R & R's total damages exceeded the $1 million "per occurrence" limit of
the primary policy, and its unsubrogated losses trigger coverage under the second $1

3

"[Ijnsurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." U. S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993)
Q

million available under the excess policy. Thus, UPCIGA is liable for the $300,000
statutory limit on both policies.4
V.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
RELIEVE R & R OF THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT
UPCIGA makes no attempt to address the inadequacy of the trial court's findings

of fact, noted by R & R in its opening brief. See Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross Appellee at 16-28. This point should be deemed conceded, and R & R and
Alumatek relieved of the marshaling requirement.
The two challenged findings contradict one another - finding 7 states that R & R
failed to disclose it had received insurance proceeds for lost rents. Finding 14 states that
R & R did disclose such information to UPCIGA on September 15, 2006, a mere 18 days
after R & R promised, in a discovery response, that it would supplement its answers.
This presents a conundrum for both R & R and Alumatek - must evidence be
marshaled showing non-disclosure of insurance proceeds for lost rents? Or must
evidence be marshaled showing disclosure of insurance proceeds for lost rents on

4

Though UPCIGA claims that "Alumatek has conceded that Judge Frederick's decision
on the stacking of the policies was erroneous," R & R makes no such concession. See
Reply Brief of Appellant^and Brief ofjCross Appellee at 15. R & R's arguments on the
excess policy stated herein provide the Utah Court of Appeals independent grounds,
supported by the record, upon which to affirm Judge Frederick's decision regarding
coverage under the excess policies. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm
the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court
to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory
is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was
not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v. Topanotes, 16 P.3d 1159,1161
(Utah 2003) (internal quotations omitted).

Q

September 15, 2006? Evidence supporting one finding would necessarily disprove the
other. Marshaling evidence would therefore amount to a nonsensical exercise. Because
the trial court's findings are logically contradictory, they are insufficient as a matter of
law and the marshaling requirement is inapplicable.
VI.

R & R PROPERLY MARSHALED ALL COMPETENT EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the trial court findings, R & R, out of caution,

undertook the marshaling requirement. UPCIGA claims that R & R "failed to marshal all
the evidence in support of the challenged findings regarding R & R's failure to disclose
insurance proceeds received from CNA Insurance for loss of rents...." See Reply Brief
of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee at 18-19. This allegation seems to evidence a
lack of understanding of both the marshaling requirement and the term "competent
evidence."
"[T]he duty to marshal evidence contemplates that an appellant present every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists and then ferret out the fatal flaw in the evidence, becoming a devil's
advocate." In re E, K, 137 P.3d 809, 822 (Utah 2006) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
Evidence marshaled must therefore 1) be introduced at trial; and 2) be competent
evidence. Black's Law Dictionary defines "competent evidence" as "admissible
evidence." "Admissible evidence" is "evidence that is relevant and is of such a character

(e.g., not prejudicial, based on hearsay, or privileged) that the court should receive it."
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., at 595-96 (2004).
In the present case, R & R would therefore have a duty to marshal relevant
admissible evidence, introduced at trial that supports the following contradictory
findings:
7. The Court finds that there was an agreement dated May 6, 2003 between
the parties that provided UPCIGA would make automatic payments of
$300,000 to R & R and Alumatek if they prevailed in the declaratory
judgment action based upon representations by R & R and Alumatek that
their damages greatly exceeded $300,000. This agreement is not
enforceable as R & R failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for
lost rent damages, and R & R and Alumatek must meet their burden of
proof before they are entitled to any damages. (R. 3452)
14. UPCIGA was not provided information about insurance proceeds
received by R & R from CNA Insurance until September 15, 2006, in the
form of the letter from Nathaneal Y. Cook of Adjusters International
introduced as trial Exhibit 24 that explains R & R received $174,227. Prior
to September 15, 2006, counsel for UPCIGA had renewed its previous
discovery request for information about insurance proceeds received by R
& R for lost rents. (R. 3453)
Upon close examination of UPCIGA's cited evidence in support of these findings,
it does not constitute "competent evidence," and in some cases is not evidence at all.
R & R has clearly fulfilled the marshaling requirement.
A.

Kelly Johnson's supplemental report (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross
Appellee at 19).

R & R has previously marshaled the trial testimony of Kelly Johnson, referencing
the preparation of his supplemental report, fulfilling the marshaling requirement on this
point. Nonetheless, Mr. Johnson's supplemental report is not relevant evidence on either
of the trial court's findings, because it never discussed when Mr. Johnson received the

11

information from R & R on lost lease income - it merely stated the date he prepared his
supplemental report. As such, it has no probative bearing on the trial court's factual
finding No. 14, that UPCIGA was not provided evidence on lost rent income until
September 15, 2006. It too, obviously, is irrelevant to factual finding No. 7, that R & R
"failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages." As such,
Mr. Johnson's supplemental report is not competent evidence subject to the marshaling
requirement.
B.

Finding that UPCIGA's expert was more credible (Reply Brief and Brief of
Cross Appellee at 19).

The fact that UPCIGA's expert on lost rent damages was found more credible and
persuasive than Mr. Johnson is not relevant evidence on either of the challenged findings.
In fact, it is not evidence at all. UPCIGA makes no attempt to explain any sort of logical
nexus between the comparative credibility of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kilbourne's
testimony, and whether 1) R & R provided evidence on lost rent income to UPCIGA until
September 15, 2006; or 2) whether R & R ever provided UPCIGA evidence on lost lease
income. As such, this is not competent evidence subject to the marshaling requirement.
C.

Judge Frederick's comments (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross Appellee at
20}.

Comments by a judge at the opening of a bench trial do not constitute evidence,
much less competent evidence.

D.

Trial testimony of Patrick Kilbourne (Reply Brief and Brief of Cross
Appellee at 20).

R & R had previously marshaled trial testimony of Mr. Kilbourne on the
preparation of his report, and therefore has complied with the marshaling requirement.
Nonetheless, the Kilbourne testimony cited here is not relevant evidence on either of the
trial court's findings, because it never discussed when UPCIGA received the information
from R & R on lost lease income - it merely stated that Mr. Kilbourne did not have the
information at the time he prepared his first report (on January 24, 2006), or at the time of
Mr. Johnson's deposition. As such, it has no probative bearing on the trial court's factual
finding No. 14, that UPCIGA was not provided evidence on lost rent income until
September 15, 2006. It too, obviously, is irrelevant to factual finding No. 7, that R & R
"failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages." As such, the
cited testimony is not competent evidence subject to the marshaling requirement.
E.

Arguments of UPCIGA counsel Gerry Holman (Reply Brief and Brief of
Cross Appellee at 21).

Though R & R previously marshaled the arguments of UPCIGA's counsel, it is
well-settled that arguments of counsel at trial do not constitute evidence. See In the
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that assertions made in oral argument by counsel, which were not included in the
affidavit of counsel's client, did not constitute evidence properly considered by the trial
court). Therefore, the arguments of UPCIGA's counsel do not constitute competent
evidence subject to the marshaling requirement.

F.

Third-Party Complaint of R & R and Summary Judgment Memorandum of
R & R (Reply Brief and Brief .of Cross Appellee at 21V

It is also well-settled that pleadings are not considered evidence, unless they are
properly offered and received as exhibits at trial. See Ryan v. Beaver County, 21 P.2d
858 (Utah 1933) ("It is the duty of the court to construe pleadings and to charge the jury
on the issues. It is not proper to permit the jury to take the pleadings with them to the
jury room, unless they have been put in evidence as proof of some fact, and then they are
taken, not because they are pleadings, but exhibits.") Since the referenced pleadings
were not offered and received as trial exhibits, they are not competent evidence subject to
the marshaling requirement.
It is telling that UPCIGA not only refers to incompetent evidence, but also nonevidence to support Judge Frederick's inexplicable action of unilaterally invalidating a
valid settlement agreement. R & R has marshaled what little evidentiary support exists in
the record for this action. Such evidence clearly does not support the findings that
UPCIGA was not provided evidence on lost rent income until September 15, 2006, or
that R & R "failed to disclose it had received insurance monies for lost rent damages."
VII.

UNILATERALLY INVALIDATING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW
In UPCIGA's attempt to distinguish the case law relied upon by R & R and

Alumatek, UPCIGA fails to address the substantive law on invalidating settlement
agreements. Generally, a negotiated written settlement can only be set aside for the
following reasons: illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake. In the Matter of
Estate ofChasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986). Evidence necessary to invalidate a
1 A

settlement agreement must be "clear, convincing, and unequivocal." Jimenez v. O'Brien,
213 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1949). The standard "is a higher degree of proof than a mere
preponderance of the evidence and approaches that degree of proof required in a criminal
case, viz., 'beyond reasonable doubt.5" Id.
The record is clear. No cause of action or counterclaim for rescission based upon
illegality, fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake was ever pled or properly before the
trial court. (R. 2686; 2695) For example, UPCIGA raises "fraud" as an affirmative
defense in its Answer, with no supporting facts. (R. 2686; 2695) This fails to plead fraud
or misrepresentation with the requisite particularity under the Utah rules. Utah R. Civ. P.
9(b); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974 , 979-80 (Utah Ct App. 2003). No motion to
invalidate the settlement agreement was ever before the trial court.5 (R. 3139-3225;
3502) Moreover, the dearth of record evidence that even touches upon the validity of the
settlement agreement, as well as the confusing and contradictory findings of the trial
court on the issue, falls far short of the "clear, convincing, and unequivocal" standard
required by Jimenez. The trial court's action of invalidating the settlement agreement
was utterly unsupported by the pleadings, the facts, or the law. The agreement should be
reinstated.

5

The court should note that even the cases cited by UPCIGA involve a motion to rescind
or enforce a settlement agreement, which was properly before the trial court. Quinn v.
City of Kansas City, 64 F.Supp.2d 1084 (D. Kan. 1999); United States v. Hardage, 982
F.2d 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). It is undisputed that no such motion was properly before
Judge Frederick.
1C

CONCLUSION
When considering the dueling interpretations of the Utah Guaranty Act, the Court
need only ask one question: which interpretation best serves the Act's stated purpose of
"protecting" insureds and policyholders? UPCIGA's interpretation of the Act would
punish insureds for buying multiple insurance policies. It would harm insureds, while
protecting only itself. This contravenes the Act's stated purpose, basic notions of
fairness, and common sense. The Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's
interpretation of the Act as well as the trial court's interpretation of UPCIGA's
obligations under both the Rehance primary and excess policies, and the trial court's
judgment in favor of R & R. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's
invalidation of the Settlement Agreement.
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2008.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Andrew M. Morse
Richard A. Vazquez
Attorneys for Appellees / Cross-Appellants
R & R Industrial Park, L. L. C.
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